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Not be confused with...
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During my time living in Nigeria, I have
found it interesting to observe the apparent disconnect between how the Boko
Haram phenomenon is interpreted by Nigerians and foreign analysts. Nigerians generally view the group as
motivated by political interest, while foreign commentary tends to focus on its
Islamist ideology.
Since the bombing of the United Nations
building in Abuja in August 2011[1],
international analysis has characterized Boko Haram as Nigeria's manifestation
of a network of terrorist organizations
with a global political agenda, motivated by extremist interpretations of
Islamic laws and traditions. Attention is principally given to Boko Haram's public
demands for the imposition of Sharia law across Nigeria, and its possible
affiliations with Al-Qaeda.[2]
(A notable exception to this analytical bent is the US Institute of Peace
report, "What is Boko Haram?"[3])
By contrast, domestic analysis regards the UN
bombing as something of an anomaly, and places much greater focus on Nigeria's
current political situation. Particular emphasis is placed on the severe
poverty and under-development prevalent in Northern Nigeria, and the role of
President Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian from the Ijaw minority tribe,
in galvanizing latent Northern opposition to the Federal government[4]
and unsuccessfully attempting to confront Boko Haram through prolonged armed
interventions and sporadic negotiations[5].
Domestic analysts are more likely to treat Boko Haram not as a single, clearly
defined sect of religious terrorists, but as a collection of loosely associated
groups, lacking common leadership, resources, ideology or objectives. In
Nigeria, it is also widely acknowledged that the label "Boko Haram"
has at times also been appropriated by groups engaged in unrelated tribal and
territorial disputes, and misapplied by the Nigerian media as a catch-all term
to identify the perpetrators of acts of violence in which known representatives
of Boko Haram denied involvement.[6]
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| Nothing to see here... |
Skepticism about the group's Islamist motivations can be attributed to the repeated undermining of the group's ideological credibility by its leadership. Firstly, statements made by Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf to the BBC Hausa service shortly before he was killed in a police raid, indicated his belief that, "the earth was flat, and that rain was not caused by evaporation from the ground."[7] Later, conflicting statements were made by the several self-appointed Boko Haram "spokesmen" about the group's willingness to negotiate with the government. More recently, strident demands by group leader Abubakar Shekau that the President should "resign and convert to Islam" were met with derision and dismissed by domestic political figures.[8]
Suspicions that the group is instead motivated by political interests have been stoked by several developments:
First, President Jonathan has publicly stated
that Boko Haram backers and sympathisers are
"in the executive arm of the government; some of them are in the
parliamentary/legislative arm of the government, while some are even in the
legislative arm. Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other
security agencies."[9]
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| ...and some are in court. |
Second, the arrest and ongoing trial of
Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume on terrorism charges, for allegedly sponsoring Boko Haram, illustrated the group's high level links in government. The accused
responded with a litany of similar allegations against prominent figures
including the Vice President, Namadi Sambo.[10]
Martin Elechi, Governor of Ebonyi State, has also commented that, “Politicians
hijacked the sect’s activities for their selfish purposes after the emergence
of President Goodluck Jonathan as the PDP candidate for last year’s
presidential elections. Immediately Jonathan was announced as the winner of the
primaries, Northern Governors started receiving text messages from their people
accusing them of being anti-Islam."[11]
Third, Boko Haram has predominantly
victimized "ordinary citizens" at churches and crowded public areas[12],
without carrying out any targeted assassinations of high profile politicians.
This is despite prevailing public frustration at Nigeria's leaders for
pervasive corruption and under-development in the country, reinforcing the
perception that the 'true' force behind the group was the politicians
themselves. It is also noteworthy that early Boko Haram attacks focused on military
and police targets, expanding to church attacks later on, suggesting that the
group's initial motive may have been political, not religious.[13]
Clearly, ideology and interest are not
mutually exclusive drivers, and Boko Haram is in all likelihood motivated by a
combination of the two. However, the policy prescriptions and strategic
challenges that must be faced in overcoming Nigeria's present insecurity will
be coloured by the perspective in which it is analyzed.
Genuine religious zealots are unlikely to be placated by the same measures that were used to bring the Niger Delta militancy to a resolution. The Delta crisis was resolved by a combination of the Presidential Amnesty Program, in which militants who handed in their weapons were provided with employment opportunities, and a major increase in government spending through the several agencies operating in the Delta region. The election of a president from the South-South area no doubt eased matters as well. Such carrots are unlikely to be sufficient enticement for someone committed to the idea of sharia law across Nigeria.
The government has certainly tried to employ the "big stick" instead, with extended deployments of a large military Joint Task Force, and major increases in the 2011 and 2012 budget appropriations for security, to little effect. The JTF have been accused of extrajudicial executions of "suspected Boko Haram" members, and human rights abuses. Their tendency towards wanton violence even drew admonition from the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, rarely the first to criticize vigorous military actions in the War On Terror. Ms Clinton talked of the need for a focus on delivering development in Northern Nigeria. Far easier said than done, but giving opportunities to some of the millions of unemployed young men would be unlikely to go amiss.
Still, poverty in Northern Nigeria is hardly a new development, while Boko Haram is a recent arrival. If one asks "what changed?" it's hard to escape the depressing conclusion that, after all is said and tried, a change of President is the single most likely remedy to this supposedly religious conflict, and no such change is imminent. Without Goodluck (whose name seems less and less apt as time goes on) it's possible this problem would not even exist. In the eyes of some, his only truly irredeemable sin is to lack the steely resolve of a military dictator like his antecedent Olusegun Obasanjo. As any taxi driver can tell you, "In Obasanjo's time, this Boko Haram of-a-thing would have stopped long ago! He would have finished them!"
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| What would OBJ do? |
[7] USIP
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